Order from us for quality, customized work in due time of your choice.
Abstract
During the American Civil War on September 17, 1862, near Sharpsburg, Maryland, and Antietam Creek, General Robert E. Lee and General George B. McClellans armies faced off in what many call a top 10 influencing battles of all times and the most bloody day of the Civil War. General McClellan, despite flaws, was victorious, which is exactly what President Lincoln needed to deliver the Emancipation Proclamation (US National Park Service, 1998). The American Civil War was ruthless and lengthy. After four years of skirmish after skirmish, battle after battle, nearly 620,000 Americans died and many more were wounded, covering America in the blood (Bandow, 2012). Antietam not only played a large political and military role in the war but drastically impacted the casualty numbers. The maneuverability and tactics displayed by Generals from the Union (North) and Confederate (South) show the importance of overwhelming numbers and violence of action.
Setting the Stage:
In order for the South to win the Civil War, General Lee and the President of the Confederate States of America understood that they needed to invade the North. This was the first of Lee’s two offensive attempts to take the war onto Northern soil (Sweet, 2014). Antietam Creek, located in Sharpsburg, Maryland was General Lees first stop on his way to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Going through Maryland would boost morale and provide the nourishment needed by his men. General Lee was meticulous and patient, and a brilliant strategist.
Sharpsburg, Maryland is located in the Antietam Valley. There are four major roads that radiate from the town, with the Boonesborough Turnpike and the Harpers Ferry road both set to cross the Antietam and were key avenues of approach. There was a small range of hills on the East bank of the Antietam, which was key terrain and proved to be a good place for Union batteries and reserve elements. One mile north of town was Dunkard Church, which served as the center point of the battle (Fuller, 1985). There were woods and timber that surrounded the battlefield but provided cover and concealment as Lee advanced on McClellan, even though a strong opposition could mean turmoil with the Confederates’ backs to the river. The Union had the advantage in terrain. They held the high ground and were massed in defensive positions along avenues of approach.
The Union and McClellans Army of the Potomac included six infantry corps; commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker, Edwin V. Sumner, Fitz John Porter, William B. Franklin, Ambrose E. Burnside, and Joseph K. Mansfield. The Lees Army of Northern Virginia only had two infantry corps commanded by Major General James Longstreet and Stonewall Jackson. Despite being outnumbered Lee was adamant about taking the fight into Maryland.
Being the strategist that Lee was and knowing his adversary, Lee planned to split his army into four in order to attack multiple fronts and surprise McClellan. The plan may have worked, but one of Lee’s commanders left a copy of the infamous Special Order No. 191 in the field, which was returned to McClellan by Union Soldiers (Bandow, 2012). With the information in hand, McClellan was easily able to mass his troops accordingly.
While Lee moved his army of 55,000 Confederates through the region. McClellan, with the help of Special Order No. 191, was able to position his 77,000 men near the exact locations where Lee would show arrive (Sweet, 2014). With 77,000 Union soldiers prepared to defend Maryland and the North and 55,000 Confederate soldiers prepared to take the fight onto northern soil, nearly 132,000 Americans would be poised ready to fight and die for America.
Morning Phase:
Dawn, September 17, 1862, the first shots rang out in the battle. Hooker’s artillery concealed in a cornfield began to pummel the Jackson and the Confederate’s advance. Hooker described, that every stalk of corn in the field was cut down and the Confederate soldiers lay in rows, just as they stood moments before (Ballard, 2008). The concealment caused confusion for the Confederates who walked right into the battery.
As the Union advanced on Jackson’s position, he was reinforced (0700) pushing the Union back. Roughly an hour later Union General Mansfield came to support Hooker and take back some of the lost ground (US National Park Service, 1998). Overwhelming firepower, surprise, and violence of action pushed the skirmish in favor of the Union. But being unable to hold the terrain meant an increase in casualties in efforts from both sides to take it back. This likely could have been avoided if either side was supported enough to establish a mobile defense.
In just two hours nearly 13,000 Americans lay in the field to the North of Sharpsburg either killed or wounded (Kennedy, 1998).
Midday Phase:
With Mansfield isolated in the west woods and General Greene holding the most advanced Union position on the battlefield. Maj. Gen. Sumner sends Gen. Sedgwick to free Mansfield from his position. At 0930, Sedgwick is outflanked on both sides of Jacksons division (Ballard, 2008). There was a gap in the line between Greene and Sedgwicks divisions, which allowed the Confederates under McLaws division to penetrate Union lines and force the Union to retrograde. Had the joint forces had better communication and battle tracking they would have been able to secure the line.
Meanwhile, around 0900 General French under General Sumner, pushes a division towards Sunken Road just south of Dunker Church and makes contact with Confederates commanded by DH Hill (Fuller, 1985). With French on the high ground, but Hill in a defensive posture, volley after volley ensued.
Hill received reinforcements, from Andersons division and the French received support from Richardson. With Anderson to support the Confederate center and Richardson to support the Union south, the skirmish rang on. Richardsons division was able to gain the high ground on the right flank of Anderson, his lead brigade was able to bring devastating enfilade fire onto the Confederate defensive positions (Fuller 1985). After hours of fighting, in a skirmish/area now more commonly known as bloody lane , the Union was able to break through the Confederate line.
Lee, noticing that his center was about to be broken, ordered Anderson to counterattack. On the attack, Anderson was killed, which brought turmoil to the Confederate advance. Richardson also, pushing to break through Confederate lines was also killed, causing confusion in the ranks. That with exhaustion ended the skirmish at ‘bloody lane’ around 1300 (Fuller, 1985). Being that the Commanders on both sides fell, there was no one able to step up and take charge, leading to confusion. If proper mission command and leadership took place either side would have been able to prevail and provide potential exploitation to the enemy. Nearly, 4,000 Americans were killed or wounded in the ‘bloody lane’.
Afternoon Phase:
So far, with a majority of the conflict taking place to the North of Sharpsburg, McClellan was getting impatient with General Burnside. Burnside had four divisions and nearly 50 guns east of Antietam Creek. Facing a greatly depleted Confederate force commanded by Jones, Burnside was stalemated. It was not until he was able to move a howitzer down closer to the bridge that his lead element was able to get within range of the enemy to effectively engage them with their muskets. Finally, Burnside was able to cross the creek, along with support from the 28th OH from the North and Rodman from the South, they were able to push what was left of Toombs Confederates back to Sharpsburg (Ballard, 2008). Lack of violence of action and adequate support by fire elements delayed the crossing of Burnsides forces. A well-dug-in and determined foe awaited them, but through persistence and tactical patience, Burnside was able to succeed.
With the Confederates on the run to Sharpsburg, Burnside had a chance to pursue and exploit the Confederate army. Had Burnside and McClellan not pursued directly they might have been able to cut off the retreat for Lee and the Confederates. Instead, McClellan orders Burnside to an uphill pursuit of Jones to Sharpsburg.
Around 1600, General A.P. Hill returning immediately joined the fight in Sharpsburg. Attacking the left of Rodman’s division, halting them in place. More confusion ensued as troops were finding it difficult to distinguish between friend or foe in the smoke and the fact that Hill’s men were wearing mixed uniforms courtesy of their success at Harper’s Ferry (Ballard, 2008). Through the confusion and the daunting effort to climb the hill through a barrage of lead, and being flanked Burnside ordered his Corp to retrograde to the creek for the night.
In the effort to pursue Jones toward Sharpsburg, Burnside’s Corps suffered nearly 2,000 casualties (Ballard, 2018). While tactical patience paid off when seizing the bridge, the lack thereof walked Burnside right into a near ‘L’ shaped ambush. Had they paused to let the battlefield develop they would have known what they were getting into. Or if Lee, did not call on Hill to re-enforce, the outcome could have been greatly changed. Not necessarily for the battle, because it was won by the Union, but they could have cut off Lees army.
Instead, the next day, Lee after learning that the Union’s flanks were heavily protected by artillery abandoned his plan to attack. The Confederate army instead withdrew back to Virginia to regroup (Ballard, 2008). McClellan and the Union Generals had Lee and the Confederates on the ‘ropes’. If the Union would have attacked a depleted and exhausted Confederate force, they would have been able to overwhelm and outmaneuver them.
Aftermath:
The Battle of Antietam was a pivotal point in the Civil War. It also lives in infamy as one of the bloodiest battles in American history. Of the approximately 132,000 soldiers at Antietam, nearly 23,000 were killed, wounded, or missing (Ballard, 2008). A devastating toll and is an everlasting reminder of how decisions on the battlefield influence the outcome.
Weeks passed and the Union army led by McClellan remained in Maryland. Lincoln grew impatient, as his orders to advance on Lee in Virginia were met with hesitation. McClellan was soon relieved of command and replacing him with Burnside (Ballard, 2008). Lincoln’s order to pursue is accurate. The goal of offensive operations is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. If the enemy retrogrades, continue the pursuit. However, like in the case of Burnside, tactical patience is key to success in pursuit operations.
Controversy exists as to who won the battle, Lee and the South were not forced to retreat but expressed tactical patience. McClellan and the North repelled the advancing South through overwhelming numbers and gained intelligence. Either way, it looked like the North repelled the South’s advance and forced them to retrograde back to Virginia. Thus, setting the stage for the greater good and delivery of President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation.
References
- Ballard, T., (2008). Battle of Antietam. Retrieved from https://history.army.mil/html/books/035/35-3-2/cmhPub_35-3-1.pdf
- Bandow, D., (2012). The Battle of Antietam: The Civil War Drenches America in Blood. Retrieved from https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/battle-antietam-civil-war-drenches-america-blood
- Kennedy, F.H., (1998). Ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. ISBN 0-395-74012-6.
- LTC Fuller, J.D., (1985). Battlefield Terrain Study: Burnsides Attack Against the Confederate Right at Antietam. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a158168.pdf
- Sweet, L., (2014). The Battle of Antietam: A Turning Point in the War. Retrieved from www.thescholarship.ecu.edu/bitstream/handle/10342/4485/sweet_lyndesy.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y
- US National Park Service, (1998). Overview of the Battle of Antietam. Retrieved from www.antietam.aotw.org/overview.php
Order from us for quality, customized work in due time of your choice.